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Introduction and synopsis
According to former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s mid-2011 in-terview with the BBC, Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 denunciation ofStalin had a pivotal impact on his new thinking, including the ger-
mination of the ideas of perestroika and glasnost. (1) Yet in China, nobody
– and no political force – has the guts, integrity, and vision to publicly
unmask and denounce Chairman Mao Zedong, who many believe to have
been responsible for more deaths than Stalin.
Since the Cultural Revolution, the closest that the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) authorities have come to evaluating the mistakes of Mao Ze-
dong is the famous Resolution on Certain Historical Questions of the CCP
since the Establishment of the People’s Republic (hereafter Resolution),
which was passed by the CCP Central Committee in 1981 under the close
supervision of Deng Xiaoping. The Resolution pointed out unequivocally
that Mao’s “contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweighed his
shortcomings” and that “his contributions were primary, his mistakes sec-
ondary.” (2) Moreover, the document’s criticisms of Mao centred on tactical
issues, mainly errors of judgment during the Cultural Revolution. Not one
word was devoted to the irrational and non-democratic nature of Maoism
or to Mao’s feudalistic governance. As Deng said at the time: “We must af-
firm the historical position of comrade Mao Zedong, and uphold and de-
velop Mao Thought. We must hoist high the flag of Mao Thought not only
today but in the future.” (3) Fourth-Generation leader President Hu Jintao
was equally effusive in eulogising the demigod. In a speech marking the
Great Helmsman’s 110th birthday in late 2003, he declared Mao to be a
“great proletarian revolutionary strategist and theorist.” While Deng at least
cited “leftist” errors committed by Mao, Hu’s hagiographic address made
no mention of his manifold blunders. (4)
This paper studies the background and significance of the Maoist revival
that began in Chongqing in late 2008 – and which spread across the nation
in the ensuing years. On 15 March 2012, Bo Xilai, the main progenitor of
the crypto-Maoist revival, was relieved of his position as Chongqing Party
secretary. Soon afterwards, his membership in the Politburo and Central
Committee was suspended. There is no indication, however, that the resus-
citation of Maoist norms has been halted due to Bo’s downfall. What, then,
are the factors behind the quasi-Maoist renaissance, which has manifested
itself in phenomena and campaigns ranging from changhong (singing red
songs) to the apparently new fad of constructing a “red GDP”? The rela-
tionship between the rekindling of Maoist norms and the Hu Jintao leader-
ship’s top agenda of upholding political stability is examined. Also discussed
are the factional dynamics behind the re-hoisting of Maoist banners. For
example, are the princelings – who seemed to be at the forefront of the po-
litical movement – singing Mao’s praises so as to consolidate the political
fortune of the so-called Gang of Princelings? The policy implications of
changhong and other Maoist rituals are also studied. This paper will also
look at the significance of the restitution of Maoism particularly with ref-
erence to the party’s potentials for reform after the pivotal 18th CCP Con-
gress of late 2012.
The genesis and major contours of 
the Maoist restoration
Revival of Maoist statues, “red songs,” and Maoist
quotations
The revival of Maoism started in 2008 and culminated in festivities sur-
rounding the 90th birthday of the CCP on 1 July 2011. The epicentre of the
revitalisation of Maoist norms is the western metropolis of Chongqing,
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which became the base of then-Party secretary Bo Xilai when the ambitious
and charismatic son of Party elder Bo Yibo (1908-2007) was transferred
there in late 2007. Mao statues – which were feverishly torn down all over
China soon after late patriarch Deng Xiaoping initiated the reform era in
1978 – were put up again by government offices, factories, and universities
in this city of 34 million people. A newly constructed seven-story statue of
the demigod in Chongqing’s college district dwarfed nearby halls, libraries,
and classroom buildings. (5) The Maoist fever soon spread elsewhere. Not far
from the Helmsman’s birthplace in the middle of Xiangjiang River in 
Changsha, Hunan Province, the latest tourist attraction was a sky-scraping,
32-meter torso of the young Mao. Moreover, the long-forgotten slogan
“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought” was resuscitated in October 2009 after
banners bearing this battle cry were held high by college students and na-
tionalistic Beijing residents during parades in Tiananmen Square that marked
the 60th birthday of the People’s Republic. (6)
Yet the most vivid – and telling – symbol of the restitution of Maoist stan-
dards is the changhong (literally, “singing red songs”) campaign, which had
become a near-universal phenomenon in the run-up to the 1 July 2011 cel-
ebration of the Party’s 90th birthday. Song-and-dance troupes that spe-
cialised in red songs, whose participants ranged from high-school students
to retirees, were sprouting like bamboo shoots in the spring. (7) Bo, a high-
profile princeling (a reference to the offspring of party elders), asked all res-
idents to learn by heart 36 Maoist-era “revolutionary songs.” Radio and TV
stations nationwide broadcast these “red ditties” – which lauded the larger-
than-life exploits of national heroes and “proletariat paragons” – at regular
intervals. (8) The 62-year-old Bo was also adept at using the new media to
spread his “red” messages. He often asked his assistants to text-message
sayings by Mao to the city’s Netizens. Bo’s favourite Mao quotations in-
cluded: “The world is ours; we must all take part in running [public] affairs”;
“Human beings need to have [a revolutionary] spirit”; “The world belongs
to young people. They are like the sun at eight or nine in the morning”; and
“Once the political line has been settled, [the quality of] cadres is the de-
ciding factor.” (9) The Cultural Revolution-era practice of dispatching students
to the countryside to “learn from the masses” was revived, first in Chongqing
and then in other cities. Nationwide, millions of Chinese flocked to “revo-
lutionary bases” such as Yan’an, Jinggangshan, and Shaoshan, the birthplace
of the Great Helmsman. (10)
Most importantly, the re-hoisting of Maoist standards has signified a
conservative turn in Chinese statecraft. Repeated appeals have been
made by ideological and propaganda departments to Party members and
college students to steep themselves in the works of Mao and the related
Marxist canon. Such exhortations are much more emphatically made
than, for example, similar calls issued by ex-president Jiang Zemin during
his so-called san jiang or “Three Emphases” campaign in the early
5. Cited in “Biggest Mao Zedong statue unveiled in China: Report,” Agence France Presse, 26 October
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statues and other symbols of Maoism, see, for example, Li Jing, “The legacy of Chairman Mao,”
China Daily, 31 July 2011, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/31/content_13017541.htm
(consulted on 3 March 2012).
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campaign in China strikes some false notes,” Los Angeles Times, 3 June 2011, http://articles.la-
times.com/2011/jun/03/world/la-fg-china-red-20110604 (consulted on 3 March 2012).
8. See Lan Shiqiu, “Chongqing asks all citizens to sing and to pass along 36 red songs,” Chongqing
Daily, 20 April 2011, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/14432278.html (consulted on 3
March 2012). Brice Pedroletti, "China sings the old red songs again,” The Guardian, art. cit.
9. For a discussion of how Bo popularised Mao quotes by using text messages, see, for example,
Hong Xuefeng, “Bo Xilai has sent out his first red text message,” People’s Daily Online, 29 April
2009, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/113795/9216543.html (consulted on 3 March 2012).
10. Cited in Jessie Jiang, “Party Time: China Pushes ‘Red Tourism’,” Time Asia Edition, 30 August 2011,
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2090876,00.html (consulted on 3 March 2012).
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Top: The 20.6-meter-tall stainless steel statue of Mao
Zedong at Chongqing Medical University in Chongqing.
Credits: Zhong Guilin, Imagechina.
Bottom: Mao Zedong youth art sculpture, Changsha.
Credits: Huang Dan/Wikimedia. 
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1990s. (11) As the following sections will make clear, the CCP leadership
has been reviving with gusto many values and policies that are unmis-
takably Maoist in nature.
The meaning of the Maoist revival and changhong
movement
What exactly lies behind the Maoist resurgence? “Some people say we are
going ‘left,’ and that we are returning to the period of the ‘Cultural Revolu-
tion’,” Bo said in mid-2011. “This is totally groundless.” (12) According to the
Deputy Director of the CCP Propaganda Department, Wang Xiaohui, chang-
hong and related rituals “have nothing to do with the national ideology and
psyche moving to the left or to the right.” Wang claimed that while chang-
hong activities proved to be popular, there were also large numbers of Chinese
who favoured popular music and even rock and roll. (13) The reality, however,
is that there was a self-conscious effort by the CCP authorities to introduce
policies that will do the Great Helmsman – and his fervent fans – proud.
A paean to patriotism – and loyalty to CCP orthodoxy
At the very least, the Maoist revival is a salvo toward promoting “spiritual
civilisation,” a concept that was raised by Deng Xiaoping to counter the
materialism that would come in the wake of the country’s market reforms
and accumulation of wealth. As then-Party secretary Bo said, “Singing the
praise of ‘redness’ means supporting what is right.” “A city must do a good
job of nurturing spiritual civilisation,” he added. Bo indicated that cadres
who are obsessed with GDP rates – but who lack spiritual values – may “go
down the road of corruption and degeneration.” (14) For most Chinese ideo-
logues and officials, a key part of spiritual civilisation is stirring up patriotic
– nationalistic – pride. As Bo put it, changhong is equivalent to “a theoretical
foundation for finding one’s roots in history, the return of ideals, the revival
of [the Chinese] race, and the rise of the nation.” (15) And since, according to
long-standing orthodoxy, it is the CCP that has made possible the advance-
ment of China, changhong also means singing the praises of the CCP.
Apart from changhong, aficionados also “read [red classics], tell [red] sto-
ries, and pass along [orthodox] axioms.” Again according to Bo, most of these
songs, classics, stories, and axioms have to do with “saving the country [from
the brink of collapse], nation-building, and constructing a strong and pros-
perous China.” (16) Songs featured in changhong concerts nationwide in-
cluded well-known ditties popularised during the anti-Japanese war of
1937-1945, as well as songs from the 1950s and 1960s. Among them were
March of the Volunteers (which doubles as the national anthem); March of
the Big Knives and Protecting the Yellow River (both anti-Japanese songs);
Sing a Song about the Motherland, Song of Lei Feng, and the more contem-
porary My Chinese Heart. Very often the singing sessions ended with the
de rigueur There Won’t Be a New China Without the Chinese Communist
Party. (17) “When we sing My Chinese Heart, we are demonstrating the co-
hesiveness, the centripetal tendency of the Chinese race,” Bo noted. “We
must unambiguously uphold artistic works that can hold tight the hearts
of the people, and that are healthy and righteous.” (18)
“Revolutionary tourism” – which is yet another offshoot of the revitalisa-
tion of Maoism – also carries immense symbolic significance. According to
Vice-President Xi, who has toured most of the “red” shrines in provinces in-
cluding Hunan, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi, meccas like Shaoshan, the birthplace
of Mao, are “resources of revolutionary tradition” and “valuable spiritual
treasures of our party.” “Red tourist spots are a vivid classroom for studying
the tradition and learning new things,” he said while touring Shaoshan in
early 2011. “They contain rich political wisdom and moral nutrients.” (19)
Even though Bo’s “red campaign” never got any official imprimatur from
top central Party organs such as the Politburo or its Standing Committee, a
number of Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and Politburo members
began visiting Chongqing in the second half of 2010 to show their support
for this conservative crusade. These top cadres included Wu Bangguo, Zhou
Yongkang, Xi Jinping, and Li Yuanchao. The official Xinhua News Agency
quoted Vice-President Xi, who toured Chongqing in December 2010, as “af-
firming the practice of singing red songs and studying [Maoist] classics…
as a means of pursuing education in [Marxist] ideals and beliefs.” (20) Li, who
is a Politburo member and Director of the CCP Organisation Department,
did not give an excessively ideological interpretation of the changhong fad
during his trip to Chongqing. He nevertheless agreed that reinstating the
“red” tradition was a laudatory patriotic experience. While in Chongqing in
April 2011, Li joined Bo in a changhong concert. Li said that changhong ac-
tivities were “conducive to propagating a [morally] uplifting social atmos-
phere.” “A large quantity of ‘people’s songs’ that reflected the heart and soul
of the people emerged during the times of the revolution, the war, and the
construction of the New China,” Li said. “We must all sing these good songs
together.” (21) Given that Li is a protégé of President Hu and a senior member
of the supremo’s Communist Youth League Faction, this was clear-cut proof
that many of the values behind Bo’s Maoism-related activities were shared
by other cliques in the CCP.
Indeed, many Chinese remember Mao as the larger-than-life founder of the
Republic and the “pride of the Chinese race.” The contributions of Mao were
played up in the blockbuster movie The Founding of a Republic, which was
specially commissioned by Party authorities to celebrate the 60th anniversary
of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. (22) Central Party
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Willy Lam – The Maoist Revival and the Conservative Turn in Chinese Politics
School theorist Li Junru, who first gained fame for his exposition of Deng’s
reform programs, characterised Mao as a titan who “led the Chinese people
in their struggle against the reactionary rule of imperialism and feudalism,
so that the Chinese race [could] stand tall among the people of the world.” (23)
Moreover, according to conservative theoretician Peng Xiaoguang, the en-
during enthusiasm for Mao Zedong Thought, particularly among the young,
testified to the intelligentsia’s search for an “ultimate faith that could speed
up China’s rise in the wake of the global financial crisis.” (24)
It was Zhang Quanjing, a former Director of the CCP Organisation Depart-
ment, who perhaps gave the most eloquent explanation of the relevance of
Maoism to twenty-first century China. In a 2011 article entitled “We Must
Unswervingly Continue to Uphold Mao Thought,” Zhang said the Great
Helmsman’s ideas consisted of the “paradigm of synthesising Marxism-Lenin-
ism and revolution and construction in China.” “Mao Thought has incorpo-
rated the wisdom of China and the world during different historical periods,”
Zhang asserted. In areas including ideology, military affairs, politics, econom-
ics, culture, technology, and sports, the ideologue indicated, Maoism was “the
crystallisation of the intelligence of the whole party and all Chinese.” (25)
Celebrating red GDP and egalitarianism
There is also a “materialistic” side to the Maoist revival: a re-emphasis on
the values of egalitarianism and social equality that a sizeable sector of the
population associates with the Maoist era. This was also a reaction to the
increasing polarisation of rich and poor – and the increasing stratification
of Chinese society based on money and privilege – that was regarded as a
result of 30-odd years of Deng Xiaoping-style reform. The spectre of “class
antagonism” was exacerbated by Jiang Zemin’s decision in 2001 to allow
private entrepreneurs, professionals, and members of the middle-classes
into the CCP. This has resulted in the social downgrading of the “lower
classes” of workers and peasants, who used to be pillars of the Party. (26)
One of the key factors behind the so-called “scientific theory of develop-
ment” of the Hu-Wen administration is to rectify many of the ill effects of
Deng and Jiang’s policies. There is significant measure of neo-Maoism behind
such of Hu’s slogans as “putting people first.” By the late 2000s, however,
it had become clear that the rich-poor gap – as well as the discrepancies
between east and west China – was yawning wider and wider. (27) Bo appar-
ently seized the opportunity to revive a kind of crypto-Maoist “red GDP,” a
supposedly non-exploitative growth model that would be populist and, in
a way, egalitarian. As Bo put it: “The most important basis of a harmonious
society is [winning] the hearts of the people.” “It’s not enough to win the
support of 10 percent or 15 percent of the people; we have to let more than
90 percent of the people feel satisfied,” he noted. (28)
Red GDP is a codeword for economic development that is geared toward
the needs of the masses – and not dictated by the greed of privileged classes
such as the country’s estimated 30 million millionaires. (29) For example,
while real estate prices in cities ranging from Shanghai to Shenzhen were
going through the roof, Chongqing cadres pledged to ensure that at least
one third of all apartments in the metropolis were affordable to workers
and farmers. For instance, Chongqing has been hailed as a pioneer in pro-
viding so-called “social security housing,” – or subsidised flats for the lower
classes. (30) This idea was picked up in the 12th Five Year Plan (2011 to 2015),
in which the Wen cabinet pledged that more than 36 million units of social
security housing would be provided nationwide during these five years. (31)
Chongqing has also attracted nationwide attention for its experiment in
the partial solution of the hukou (residence permit) system – which has
since the 1950s prevented rural-born Chinese from moving to and settling
in the cities. Urban-rural segregation is set to be abolished within the mu-
nicipality by the mid-2010s, when all Chongqing residents can live and work
within the confines of the municipality. (32)Yet Bo’s most attention-grabbing
policy was his crusade against the triads (or Chinese mafia) – the so-called
dahei (“strike the dark forces”) campaign – in 2009. Within a period of six
months, Chongqing police arrested 24 big-time crime bosses, who coughed
up 1.7 billion yuan of ill-gotten gains. In addition, more than 200 mid-to-
high-ranking officials in Chongqing’s law-enforcement and judicial depart-
ments were nabbed for taking bribes from criminals. These bad apples
included the former head of the Chongqing Judicial Bureau, Wen Qiang.
Wen, who is also a former police chief, admitted to taking bribes and gifts
totalling nearly 100 million yuan. (33)
In addition, Bo sought to placate the petitioners – “lower-class” Chinese
who want to present senior officials with their grievances – by asking some
200,000 municipal employees to regularly meet with residents who claim
to be victims of bureaucratic and other forms of injustices. (34) Bo and the
Chongqing mayor, the master bureaucratic fixer Huang Qifan, indicated that
the key to the CCP maintaining its perennial ruling-party status was
“whether it is tightly linked with the people and the masses.” “Chairman
Mao put it best: we must serve the people with all our hearts and minds,”
Bo noted. “The party will become impregnable if cadres from top to bottom
are tightly bonded with the masses” (35)
There are critics galore, however, who think that Bo’s so-called red GDP
concept is but a regurgitation of bits and pieces of the Hu-Wen adminis-
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tration’s “scientific theory of development.” Several central and provincial
cadres had as early as 2008 propagated concepts including “attaining GDP
without blood” or “green GDP.” (36) Appeals to a more egalitarian society
have also repeatedly been made by Premier Wen, who said famously at a
National People’s Congress (NPC) conference in 2010 that “social equality
and justice should shine even brighter than the sun.” Moreover, one of the
earlier pioneers of social-security housing was PBSC member and Hu Jintao
protégé Li Keqiang when he was Party Secretary of Liaoning Province from
2004 to 2007. (37) Ironically, Bo had neglected the issue of housing for the
poor when he was governor of Liaoning from 2001 to 2004. However, the
charismatic princeling’s ability to generate publicity – and to garner plaudits
– by repackaging others’ ideas as his own certainly testified to his political
skills. This also demonstrates that talk about egalitarianism and social justice
by the crypto-Maoists was often a public-relations exercise geared toward
boosting the political fortunes of individual cadres.
Deeper-level factors behind the Maoist
revival
On a deeper level, the quasi-Maoist renaissance is a political movement
undertaken by the CCP leadership to uphold political stability and weed out
challenges to the regime. Factional dynamics is also involved. The Party’s
much-attenuated liberal wing – which consists of the remnant followers of
the late titans Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang – has been dealt a body blow.
And the taizidang, or Gang of Princelings, of which Bo is a well-known leader,
is cynically using the changhong crusade to enhance the political fortunes
of cadres with “revolutionary bloodlines.”
The mainstream factions’ views about the Maoist
restoration
A perennial problem for the post-Cultural Revolution mainstream ruling
factions – including the Deng Xiaoping Faction, the Shanghai Faction led by
ex-president Jiang Zemin, and the Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction
headed by President Hu Jintao – is how to strike a balance between leftists
(ultra-radical crypto-Maoists) on the one hand, and rightists (pro-West lib-
erals) on the other. The leftists fully acknowledge the precept of one-party
dictatorship under the CCP, but they are opposed to market-oriented re-
forms begun by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s – and followed by Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao – especially privatisation and China’s integration with
the global marketplace. Leftists, who are also called the New Leftists, have
also laid into the unholy alliance between senior Party cadres and big busi-
ness, which has resulted in the emergence of super-rich clans within the
Party’s upper echelons. (38) Being successors of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang,
rightists advocate no-holds-barred adoption of international values, includ-
ing Western-style political reforms. At least in the eyes of pro-status quo
leaders ranging from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, the rightists’ hidden
agenda is to emulate Mikhail Gorbachev by “changing the nature of the
party” through political liberalisation. (39)
For leaders including Deng, Jiang, and Hu, leftists or Maoists are consider-
ably easier to handle than rightists. The rule of thumb is to ignore the neo-
Maoists’ criticisms of market reforms as well as capitalist-style corruption.
However, aspects of Maoism that dovetail with the goals of the regime –
especially the glorification of nationalism as well as national heroes such
as Mao – have been incorporated into the Hu leadership’s programs of pro-
moting stability through means such as slamming dissidents who support
the “rightist” goals of political liberalisation. (40) Thus, even though President
Hu has up to mid-2012 never made any pronouncement on the changhong
movement, he and his Politburo allies are happily tailoring the Maoist cam-
paign to their particular needs. The latter include hitting out at dissidents
such as Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei in addition to members of the CCP’s rem-
nant liberal faction. (41)
Weeding out “bourgeois-liberal” values and imposing
tighter ideological control 
Irrespective of the controversial reputation of Mao Zedong, Maoism rep-
resents Communist Party orthodoxy, the sacrosanct heirlooms of the CCP’s
90-year struggle to become not only China’s “perennial ruling party” but
also the largest and most powerful political party in the world. Playing up
Maoism is a handy way for the CCP leadership to prevent the spread of
“bourgeois-liberal,” Westernised – and potentially destabilising – values. This
is particularly significant in light of the fact that beginning with the riots in
Tibet and neighbouring provinces in March 2008, “anti-Beijing” sentiments
and activities have been on the increase. In 2010, there were an estimated
180,000 counts of “mass incidents,” a euphemism for riots, disturbances,
and other instances of social unrest. (42) The “colour revolutions” that began
in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 raised the spectre of a “Jasmine Revolu-
tion” that might one day sweep the CCP into the dustbin of history. (43)
From 2008 onwards, the Hu-led Politburo began to underscore the im-
perative of a yiyuanhua (one-dimensional or “monolithic”) guiding principle
in ideology and policies of state. This was made clear by President Hu’s
speech in December 2008 marking the 30th anniversary of the start of the
N o . 2 0 1 2 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 9
36. Regional cadres such as Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang and Shanxi Party Secretary Zhang
Baoshun indicated as early as 2008 that they did not want to achieve “GDP that is tainted with
blood.” See, for example, “Zhang Baoshun: We resolutely do not want GDP that is tainted with
pollution and blood,” People’s Daily Internet Edition, 17 October 2010, http://leaders.
people.com.cn/GB/8188892.html (consulted on 3 March 2012).
37. For a discussion of the clearing up of squatters in Liaoning, see, for example, “Liaoning’s ‘No. 1
people’s livelihood project’ allows 1.55 million people to say goodbye to squatters’ area,” CNTV.cn,
11 January 2011, http://news.cntv.cn/20110111/100943.shtml (consulted on 3 March 2012); “Li
Keqiang:  ‘Let’s save on other expenses so as to transform the squatters’ district’,” Xinhua News
Agency, 12 March 2006, www.xinhuanet.com/chinanews/2006-03/12/content_6446248.htm
(consulted on 3 March 2012); See also “Wen Jiabao meets the foreign media,” Xinhua News
Agency, 14 March 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/14/content_13169432.htm
(consulted on 3 March 2012).
38. For a discussion of China’s “New Left,” see, for example, Ariana Eunjung Cha, “For China’s new left,
old values,” The Washington Post, 19 April 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2009/04/18/AR2009041801939.html (consulted on 3 March 2012); also see Pankaj Mishra,
“China’s new leftist,” The New York Times, 15 October 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/mag-
azine/15leftist.html (consulted on 3 March 2012).
39. For a discussion of the CCP leadership’s attitude toward “rightists,” see, for example, Jian Jubo,
“China at a crossroad: Right or left?” Asia Times, 24 April 2009 www.atimes.com/
atimes/China/KD24Ad01.html (consulted on 3 March 2012).
40. For a discussion of the Hu leadership’s measures to uphold political stability, see, for example,
Willy Lam, “Beijing’s blueprint for tackling mass incidents and social management,” China Brief,
25 March 2011, www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37696
(consulted on 3 March 2012).
41. For a discussion of Beijing’s treatment of dissidents in 2010 and 2011, see, for example, Ariel Zir-
ulnick, “Five famous jailed dissidents in China: Ai Weiwei to Liu Xiaobo,” Christian Science Monitor,
12 April 2011, www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0412/Five-famous-jailed-dissidents-
in-China-Ai-Weiwei-to-Liu-Xiaobo/Ai-Weiwei (consulted on 3 March 2012); so also, Ku Yang, “Bei-
jing Intensifies Pressure as Jasmine Smile Hits China,” Human Rights in China (New York) Briefing,
www.hrichina.org/crf/article/5420 (consulted on 3 March 2012).
42. Cited in “China’s spending on internal police force in 2010 outstrips defense budget,” Bloomberg
News, 6 March 2011, www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-06/china-s-spending-on-internal-po-
lice-force-in-2010-outstrips-defense-budget.html (consulted on 3 March 2012).
43. For a discussion of authorities’ tactics toward a possible “Jasmine Revolution,” see, for example,
Ian Johnson, “Calls for a ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in China persist,” The New York Times, 23 February
2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/asia/24china.html (consulted on 3 March 2012);
also see Chris Hogg, “China’s security tsar warns over ‘Jasmine revolution’,” BBC news, 21 February
2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12522856 (consulted on 3 March 2012).
Willy Lam – The Maoist Revival and the Conservative Turn in Chinese Politics
Era of Reform. The supremo vowed that the CCP would uphold the “Four
Cardinal Principles” of stern party control – and that the government would
do whatever it took to “boost its ability to guard against changes [to a cap-
italist system] and to withstand risks” such as socio-political instability. Hu
also delivered a stern warning to liberal cadres who favoured the adoption
of at least some form of international values such as elections and the rule
of law. The CCP, he said, “will never take the deviant path of changing the
flag and standard [of party orthodoxy].” (44)
Hu’s message has been repeated by top officials such as NPC Chairman
Wu Bangguo and Chen Kuiyuan of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS). In March 2011, Wu shocked even Chinese intellectuals by enunciating
his “Five Nos” principle, including the fact that the CCP would never “under-
take the diversification of [the Party’s] guiding principle.” (45) In a major article
released at about the same time, CASS’s Chen pointed out that the CCP and
all Chinese can only follow one principle: Marxism. All CCP members must
“believe in Marxism and be resolute Marxists,” he said. “Both the party char-
ter and the Constitution have clearly stipulated that Marxist theory is the
theoretical basis of the guiding principle of our party and state,” he said.
“Marxism,” of course, is an omnibus term that incorporates allied creeds such
as Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, all of which are part of the sacrosanct
“Four Cardinal Principles.” As Chen said, “we have to study the theoretical
system of socialism with Chinese characteristics; we have to synthesise the
study of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought.” (46)
Supremo-in-waiting Xi Jinping (who is the son of former vice-premier Xi
Zhongxun) has also played a sizeable role in the propagation of the yiyuan-
hua or monolithic approach to ideology. Since becoming President of the
CCP Central Party School (CCPCPS) in 2007, he has been stepping up old-
style Marxist – and Maoist – indoctrination. For example, at the opening of
a CPS semester in April 2011, Xi urged students to “pay attention to the
Marxist canon,” especially Mao’s classic writings. “Cadres must seriously
study Marxist theory to ensure that they can maintain political resolute-
ness,” he said. Xi added that since Marxist classics were voluminous, “We
should focus on the salient points, and concentrate on studying the quin-
tessence – particularly the important works of Mao Zedong.” (47)
Indeed, the heir-apparent to Hu likes to sprinkle his homilies to CCPCPS
students with Mao’s words of wisdom. Xi’s repeated emphasis on recruiting
and grooming neophytes who are “both politically upright and professionally
competent” echoes Mao’s dictum on picking officials who are “both red and
expert.” While talking about “party construction,” or ways to ensure the ide-
ological purity of CCP cells, Xi noted that the leadership must learn from
the “great party-construction engineering project that was successfully pi-
oneered by the First-Generation leadership with comrade Mao Zedong as
its core” (48) When he was touring the provinces, Xi liked to celebrate “pro-
letariat paragons” first lionised by Chairman Mao. Thus, while inspecting the
Daqing Oilfield in Heilongjiang Province in late 2009, the vice-president eu-
logised the “spirit of the Iron Man of Daqing,” a reference to the well-nigh
super-human exploits of Wang Jinxi, the legendary oilfield worker. Xi has
also heaped praise on “heroes of the masses” such as the self-sacrificing fire
fighter Lei Feng and the altruistic county Party secretary Jiao Yulu. (49)
While Hu seldom talks about Maoism, he has been vigorously propagating
strait-laced orthodoxy and uniformity of thought through the campaign of
“Sinicising and popularising Marxism.” As far back as 2006, Hu earmarked
more than $10 million to set up a new Marxism-Leninism Academy. Its
function was to churn out up-to-date – and Sinicised – works of Marxism. (50)
At a 2010 forum on “promoting popular contemporary Chinese Marxism,”
Director of the CCP Propaganda Department Liu Yunshan pointed out that
cadres should “deeply grasp the laws of Marxist development, and better
arm the entire party – and educate the people – with the theoretical system
of Chinese socialism.” “We must take hold of the people through better [use
of] the latest fruits of the Sinicisation of Marxism,” said Liu, a conservative
commissar who often acts as Hu’s spokesman. (51)
Using Maoism to hit out at “rightist” intellectuals
The Maoist campaign has also constituted a potent attack on efforts by
the Party’s much-weakened liberal faction – and intellectuals in general –
to spread Western or international values. It is not surprising that Wen Dao
and Ning Yunhua, both frequent contributors to the leftist Utopia website
(wyzxsx.com), (52) the Maoist camp’s main Net vehicle, characterised the
changhong campaign thus: “These red songs, soaked with the bright red
blood of revolutionary martyrs, are the spiritual medicine people need to
free themselves of the poison of Western class society and spiritual
opium.” (53)
The partial restoration of Maoist practices has thrown light on the peren-
nial struggle between crypto-Maoist conservatives and pro-West intellec-
tuals. Take, for example, the ferocious ideological battle between a group of
liberal intellectuals led by Mao Yushi and Xin Ziling on the one hand, and
the New Left, or quasi-Maoists, represented by the Utopia website on the
other. Xin, a rebel intellectual who served in the PLA, published his The Fall
of the Red Sun in early 2011. The book, which chronicled Mao’s horrendous
blunders, is in some ways comparable to the best-selling tome Mao, the
Untold Story written by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday. (54) In his review of
Red Sun, the well-known economist Mao Yushi (not related to the Great
Helmsman) wrote: “Since [Mao] was not a god, he will be removed from
the altar, divested of all the myth that used to shroud him, and receive a
just evaluation as an ordinary human being.” (55)
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Peking University’s He Weifang, an internationally famous legal scholar
and human rights activist, has thrown his support behind the de-Maoifica-
tion movement. In a series of articles in 2010 and 2011, Professor He
pointed out that the “new China” built by Mao “has inherited the trappings
of feudalism.” “The unlimited power of the deified leader has exceeded even
that of dynastic emperors,” He wrote, adding that “the totalitarian control
over the spirit and thoughts was the most classic” example of Maoist
tyranny. While talking about the Cultural Revolution, Professor He indicated
that Chinese must raise their guard against recent efforts to revive Mao’s
authority. “Chinese ignorance about the Cultural Revolution and efforts by
certain political forces to exploit this ignorance has constituted a barrier to
the deepening of China’s reform and opening up.” (56)
Xin and Mao’s call for ending a Mao-style personality cult drove Maoists
into a rage. On Wyzxsx.com and other conservative forums, Mao Yushi was
labelled a “capitalist running dog,” a “cow ghost” and a “snake demon.” One
New Left group even collected 10,000 signatures to support its demand
that police arrest the liberal economist for alleged subversion and libel. (57)
While the police and state-security apparatus are unlikely to go after op-
ponents to the reinvigoration of Maoist values, the authorities are more
than happy to let leftist forces put pressure on progressive intellectuals rep-
resented by Mao Yushi and Xin.
It is also significant that figures such as Mao Yushi and Xin represent the
CCP’s remnant liberal wing – followers of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang who
suffered a devastating blow in the wake of the 4 June 1989 massacre. Fight-
ing the Mao-style personality cult is but part of the liberals’ agenda: their
main goal is to introduce internationally recognised political norms, includ-
ing multi-party politics, and freedom of the media and religion. The out-
bursts of Mao Yushi and Xin were the latest manifestations of a line of
thinking that started with such illustrious contemporaries of Hu Yaobang
as deputy People’s Daily editor Wang Ruoshui and theorist Li Honglin. (58)
Wang, author of the much-claimed The Newly Discovered Mao Zedong,
was the first intellectual who dared propose that Mao’s portrait be removed
from the rostrum of Tiananmen Square. In the early days of Deng’s reform,
Li gave a vastly influential internal speech entitled “Leaders and the People,”
in which the avant-garde theorist castigated the mentality behind Mao wor-
ship. “It is not true that the people should be loyal to leaders; leaders should
be loyal to the people,” he said. (59)
Among senior cadres, Premier Wen Jiabao is considered by a sizeable num-
ber of intellectuals to be a keen proponent of political reform – as well as
international norms. In an article that he wrote for the Xinhua News Agency
in early 2007, Premier Wen openly pressed for the adoption of pushi jiazhi,
or “universal values.” “Democracy, a [fair] legal system, freedom, human
rights, egalitarianism…are not unique to capitalism,” Wen indicated. “They
are values that all humankind is jointly pursuing.” (60) The premier continued
to make propaganda for political reform during his much-noted tour of
Shenzhen in the summer of 2010. Without the “guarantee” of political re-
form, Wen said in the special economic zone, “the fruits of the reform of
the economic structure may be lost, and it will be impossible to realise the
goal of modernisation.” (61) It is likely that the conservatives were targeting
Wen in addition to less prominent figures such as Mao Yushi.
Using Maoist tactics against dissidents – and the rapid
deterioration of rule of law
Gradually but inevitably, China has taken on the traits of a police state.
Human rights conditions have deteriorated even as the law-enforcement
apparatus is committed to “nipping all destabilising forces in the bud.” In
the days of Jiang Zemin, the police and state-security personnel just locked
up dissidents; in the past few years, they have even incarcerated the
spouses and close relatives of public intellectuals such as Nobel Laureate
Liu Xiaobo. Even after a human-rights lawyer or NGO activist such as Gao
Zhicheng is released, he or she is still subject to either house arrest or 24-
hour surveillance. (62) The Hu administration’s determination to emasculate
all potential sources of opposition, which include NGOs and the media –
was reflected in the budget allocated for the purpose of wei-wen or “up-
holding stability.” In 2012, the NPC approved outlays worth US$111.4 bil-
lion for public-security departments. In comparison, the PLA budget was
only $106.5 billion. This was the second time in a row that wei-wen ex-
penditures exceeded those of the military. Regional wei-wen budgets for
provinces and cities including Liaoning, Guangdong, Beijing, and Suzhou
also went up by an annual average rate of at least 15 percent in the late
2000s. (63)
Maoism – and Mao’s well-recorded penchant for mercilessly smashing all
opposition – has provided perhaps the best justification for this scorched-
earth policy toward dissent. It was, after all, the Great Helmsman who in-
stituted the largest-scale pogroms against dissidents and free-thinkers – the
Anti-Rightist Movement (ARM) – in the 1950s. Deng Xiaoping was a key
executor of the ARM crusade, (64) and it was not surprising that when Deng
rolled out the Four Cardinal Principles in the early 1980s to ensure that his
economic reform would not spawn bourgeois-liberalisation, he again re-
sorted to the Maoist tactic of imposing “the dictatorship of the proletariat”
on oppositionists including Wei Jingsheng, Guo Luoji, and Liu Binyan. (65)
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The Hu leadership has in particular taken inspiration from the Maoist tra-
dition of wufa wutian (“no law, no heavenly justice”) in hitting out at real
and potential enemies of the regime. The years 2007 and 2008 marked a
pronounced deterioration of the legal system as the Party’s zhengfa wei, or
Central Commission on Legal and Political Affairs (CCPLA), was given more
authority than ever to closely supervise the operations of judges and
lawyers. Hu pointed out at a national conference on legal and judicial mat-
ters in late 2007 that the foremost task of judges and law-enforcement
cadres was to “uphold party leadership” and to “serve the party’s interests.”
The Party chief also mentioned goals such as “serving the people” and “safe-
guarding the sanctity of the Constitution and the law”; but these two ob-
jectives paled beside that of sub-serving the CCP. (66)
In March 2008, Wang Shengjun, a former police officer and CCPLA bu-
reaucrat who does not have a law degree, was appointed President of the
Supreme People’s Court, China’s equivalent of Chief Justice. Ridiculed as a
famang (legal ignoramus) by liberal legal scholars, Wang has since urged
the nation’s judges to fulfil political missions such as “promoting stability”
and “ensuring social harmony.” Wang also called upon judges to “ensure
the correct political direction of the people’s courts” and to rally behind
the leadership of the “Party central authorities with comrade Hu Jintao as
general secretary.” (67) It is interesting that in his talks to judges, Wang has
often admonished them to “deeply study the ‘two major theoretical sys-
tems’ of Mao Zedong Thought and socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Like other senior cadres, the chief justice likes to engage in “red tourism.”
While visiting the “revolutionary mecca” of Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, in 2010,
Wang praised the contributions of the CCP founders such as Mao, Zhu De,
and Zhou Enlai: “Ruijin is the cradle of the People’s Republic of China,” he
said. “It is also the wellspring of people’s justice, as well as the root of the
people’s courts.” (68)
It is also significant that princeling Bo was subjected to repeated attacks
by liberal lawyers and law professors for imposing “rough justice” on
Chongqing. In the course of his anti-triad campaign, then-Party secretary
Bo was said to have put pressure on local judges to expedite convictions.
Renowned defence attorney Li Zhuang, who acted for alleged triad boss
Gong Gangmo, was convicted by the Chongqing court of perverting the
course of justice. This caused such a big uproar in the Chinese legal com-
munity that Li was released unconditionally in 2011. The former Chongqing
party boss was also accused of harassing residents who did not agree with
his crypto-Maoist campaigns. For example, blogger Fang Hong, a 45-year-
old retired forestry bureau official, was in early 2011 sent to reform-
through-labour for daring to point out in his microblog that Bo had been
manipulating the legal system for political ends. (69)
How the Maoist revival helps strengthen the Gang of
Princelings and the legitimacy of the “red
aristocrats”
As with most political trends in China, the resuscitation of Maoist norms
is intricately related to factional intrigue. Jockeying for position between
the two major CCP cliques – the Gang of Princelings and the CYL Faction –
has intensified in the run-up to the 18th CCP Congress. At this critical con-
clave slated for 2012, the Fourth-Generation leadership under President Hu
and Premier Wen is due to yield power to the Fifth-Generation leadership,
or cadres born in the late 1940s to mid-1950s. As we saw in earlier sections,
Bo Xilai and Vice-President Xi Jinping, two prominent princelings, are among
the most ardent architects of the quasi-Maoist renaissance. Implicit in the
princelings’ re-hoisting of the Maoist flag is a veiled critique of the policies
undertaken by Hu and his CYL Faction, which seem to have exacerbated
the polarisation of rich and poor and spawned a kind of crass commercialism
that runs counter to Maoist spiritual values. (70)
Much more significantly, the princelings are using the Maoist crusade to
lobby for more clout and authority in the polity. The political fortune of the
Gang of Princelings suffered quite a blow during the first decade of the Era
of Reform. Deng Xiaoping was against allowing too many princelings to mo-
nopolise Party and government posts. In the early 1980s, Deng reportedly
indicated in an internal Party meeting that the proportion of taizidang Cen-
tral Committee members should be limited. Instead of seeking a political
career, princelings were encouraged to go into business. (71) It was no acci-
dent that both of the patriarch’s sons, Deng Pufang and Deng Zhifeng, were
successful if also controversial businessmen. The same goes for the children
of Third- and Fourth-Generation leaders including Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji,
Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao. (72)
The political careers of many princelings were affected by Deng’s stricture.
Bo, for example, did not get into the Central Committee until 2002, even
though he had years earlier established himself as a formidable “warlord”
in industrialised Liaoning Province. A number of high-profile princelings, in-
cluding Xi Jinping, Wang Qishan (son-in-law of the late Vice-Premier Yao
Yilin), and Deng Pufang made it into the Central Committee also at a rela-
tively late stage of their careers. The trio were first elected into the Central
Committee in 1997 as alternate, or second-tier and non-voting, members.
Moreover, Xi got the least – and Deng and Wang respectively the second
and seventh lowest – number of votes among the 151 alternate mem-
bers. (73) By the 2000s, however, the princelings had made a strong come-
back. Bo’s fairly successful Maoist campaign was widely seen as a
Machiavellian manoeuvre to enable him to secure a slot on the new PBSC
that will be established at the 18th Party Congress. Wang, who became Vice-
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Premier in March 2008, is heavily tipped to get into the PBSC at this crucial
congress. (74)
Moreover, the princelings’ clout is particularly pronounced within the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army. Several dozen major-generals, lieutenant-generals, and
full generals boast distinguished pedigrees. The following princeling generals
are considered to have a high chance of making the policy-setting Central
Military Commission that will be formed at the 18th Party Congress: Air Force
Commander Xu Qiliang, Deputy Chief of General Staff Ma Xiaotian, General
Logistics Department Political Commissar Liu Yuan, Political Commissar of
the Second Artillery Corps Zhang Haiyang, and Shenyang Military Region
Commander Zhang Youxia. (75)
The princelings are cunningly using the Maoist-restitution drive to further
exploit their advantage of illustrious lineage. After all, as the famous Chinese
proverb goes: “He who has won heaven and earth has the right to be their
rulers.” This was the basis of the “revolutionary legitimacy” of the First- and
Second-Generation leadership under Mao and Deng respectively. As the
sons and daughters of Long March veterans, princelings regard their “revo-
lutionary bloodline” as a prime political resource. (76) Thus, while visiting the
“revolutionary mecca” of Jinggangshan in Jiangxi Province in 2008, Xi paid
homage to the “countless martyrs of the revolution who used their blood
and lives to win over this country.” “They laid a strong foundation for the
good livelihood [we are enjoying],” he said. “Under no circumstances can
we forsake this tradition.” (77) Similarly, while marking National Day on 1
October 2008, Bo urged Chongqing’s cadres “to forever bear in mind the
ideals and hot-blooded [devotion] of our elders.” “Forsaking [their revolu-
tionary tradition] is tantamount to betrayal,” Bo instructed. (78)
It is also not surprising that the military offspring of Party elders and Long
March-generation generals have since 2010 been a strong force behind the
changhong movement. Take, for instance, the high-powered group called
“Singing Troupe of 100 Offspring of Generals.” Senior members of the troupe
include the sons and daughters of Marshals Chen Ye, Nie Rongjun, Luo
Rongheng and He Long, respectively Chen Haosu, Nie Li, Luo Dongjin, and
He Xiaoming. (79) Owing to the aura of respectability attached to their fa-
thers, these military taizidang felt a sense of pride in singing “revolutionary
songs,” many of which were associated with the Great Helmsman. Like their
civilian counterparts such as Xi Jinping, military princelings want to play up
the symbolic value of their pedigree – and their fitness to play a major role
in Chinese military and political affairs. (80)
Is the ouster of Bo an indication of the end
of the Maoist campaign?
Things began to fall apart for Bo Xilai before Chinese New Year in January
2012, an intriguing course of events that led to the “suspension” of his
Politburo membership in April. Given that Beijing has been reluctant to
release critical evidence regarding this mammoth case, the following ac-
count has been pieced together from reports from the foreign and Hong
Kong press – as well as other credible sources in Beijing. Bo the regional
“warlord” began to fall out with one of his closest aides, then-Chongqing
vice-mayor and head of public security Wang Lijun. Wang, known as a “na-
tional anti-triad hero” for his role in smashing triad gangs, told his boss
he was investigating Bo’s wife, the power lawyer Gu Kailai, for possible in-
volvement in the death of British businessman Neil Heywood. Bo was so
mad that he relieved Wang of his police duties and instead put the vice-
mayor in charge of higher education and the environment. (81) Seeing the
writing on the wall, Wang, who is believed to also have been under inves-
tigation for corruption offences during the long years that he served in
Liaoning Province, tried to seek political asylum at the Chengdu US Con-
sulate General on 6 February. One day later, Wang emerged from the con-
sulate and was taken to Beijing by senior officials from the Ministry of
State Security.
At least publicly, Bo seemed unfazed. He attended the annual National
People’s Congress that opened on 5 March. At an NPC press conference, the
princeling admitted that he had made the mistake of yongren bucha, or
“hiring officials without careful consideration.” But he defended himself
against innuendo that his wife and kin were involved in improper economic
dealings. On 15 March, however, Xinhua announced in a terse statement
that Bo had been relieved of his duties as Chongqing Party secretary. And
on 10 April, the Party leadership suspended Bo of his Politburo and Central
Committee membership on account of “serious discipline violations.” Xinhua
reported that Gu was complicit in Heywood’s death. Beijing was awash with
rumours that Bo was hatching a plot against Hu and Xi Jinping, who is due
to take over the post of Party General Secretary at the 18th CCP Congress. (82)
The main factor behind Bo’s ouster seemed to be the animosity between
the ultra-ambitious princeling on the one hand, and Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao on the other. There was also a bitter power struggle between the
Gang of Princelings and the CYL Faction. Of the nine PBSC members, only
Hu has not visited Chongqing since Bo was transferred there in late 2007.
Premier Wen was briefly in the metropolis in December 2008 – mainly to
assess the impact of the global financial crisis on western China. But he said
nothing about the anti-triad or the changhong movements that Bo had just
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launched. (83) As we saw in the above sections, while there were major dif-
ferences between the philosophies and ideology of Bo and Wen, Bo’s crypto-
Maoist ideals and statecraft were not significantly different from those of
either Hu or other BPSC members such as Xi Jinping, Li Changchun, or Zhou
Yongkang. It thus seems evident that Bo’s disgrace will not necessarily mean
the end of either the “Chongqing model” or the Maoism movement.
It is true that at Wen’s penultimate NPC international press conference
just one day before Bo’s dismissal as Chongqing chief, the liberal premier
indirectly criticised Bo by warning against “a return of the Cultural Revolu-
tion.” In his meeting with veteran Hong Kong-based NPC member Wu Kang-
min in 2011, Wen also decried the possible resuscitation of “the remnant
poison” of the Cultural Revolution. (84) Immediately after Bo’s downfall, there
were signs that the Party leadership was reining in the crypto-Maoist ex-
cesses associated with Bo and the Chongqing model. For example, several
websites that used to sing the praises of Bo’s ideas – wyzxzx.com and Red-
flag.net – were closed down for “maintenance.” Yang Fan, an economics and
politics professor at the China University of Politics and Law who had eulo-
gised the Chongqing model, said he would have to take a second look at
the track record of Bo and his associates. There was also speculation that
Wen had taken advantage of Bo’s political demise to push for his long-time
goal of changing the official verdict of the 1989 pro-democracy student
movement. (85)
However, it was evident that the bulk of the political manoeuvres and ide-
ological campaigns undertaken by the Hu leadership in the wake of the
Wang Lijun and Bo Xilai incidents were geared toward upholding stability
and political conformism among civilian and military officials. Apart from
the Mao-oriented websites, a large number of liberal blogs and websites
were put out of action. Several Netizens were arrested for “spreading ru-
mours” on the information superhighways. Cyberpolice departments also
launched a nationwide campaign to clear the Net of criminal and politically
incorrect elements. The treatment of dissidents and human rights activists
including Ai Weiwei, Gao Zhisheng, and Chen Guangcheng remained ex-
tremely harsh. Chen was forced to seek refuge in the American Embassy in
Beijing in late April. (86) A number of Chinese intellectuals saw Bo’s political
demise as a vindication of Premier Wen’s advocacy of reform – and a pos-
sible harbinger of some form of political loosening up to come in 2013. For
example, Wang Kang, a Chongqing-based scholar and documentary film-
maker, said that “Bo’s ouster marks a turning point in China’s history and
gives China an opportunity.” Yet Wang was clear-headed enough to note
that the victory scored by the likes of Wen was “still very fragile.” Other in-
tellectuals are less sanguine about what Bo’s fall may portend. For example,
Wu Si, a famous public intellectual associated with the liberal journal Yan-
huang Chunqiu, told the foreign media he was disappointed that the Bo in-
cident had not resulted in any policy liberalisation. “On first look, I think it’s
a good thing,” Wu said with reference to the impact of Bo’s downfall on po-
litical developments. “But on second look, I think, not necessarily.” (87)
Actually, the loyalty drives implemented after Bo’s ouster seemed to tally
more with the Maoist ideal of the yiyantang or “one voice chamber” rather
than political reforms advocated by the likes of Premier Wen. Emblematic
of these calls for uniformity of thinking and unquestioned loyalty to the
Party leadership was the Campaign to Learn from Lei Feng that was organ-
ised in different provinces and PLA units. (88) “Proletariat paragon” Lei Feng
was lionised by Mao Zedong in the 1950s for his unreserved fealty to the
Party central authorities. For example, in a speech marking the Learn From
Lei Feng Campaign in Hunan Province, Party Secretary Zhou Qiang pointed
out that “the Lei Feng spirit has clear-cut contemporary traits.” “The Lei
Feng spirit will never become obsolete; it is eternal in nature,” said Zhou, a
notable Sixth-Generation tuanpai politician who is rumoured to be a post-
18th Congress candidate for the post of Chongqing party boss. (89)
PLA units at headquarters and regional levels underwent a propaganda
exercise entitled “We must inherit Lei Feng’s gun.” According to CMC Vice-
Chairman General Xu Caihou, CMC Chairman Hu instructed officers “to push
forward the Lei Feng spirit with a strong sense of political responsibility and
a high degree of self-consciousness.” (90) One week after Bo’s disgrace, the
Liberation Army Daily ran a commentary entitled “Opposing and Getting
Rid of Liberalism.” It cited Mao Zedong’s article “In Opposition to Liberal-
ism,” which was written 75 years ago. The Great Helmsman pointed out at
the time that “liberalism within the collective organs of the revolution is
very detrimental” because this would foster problems such as “weak organ-
isation” and “divergence of views.” (91)
The new line on political rectitude and conformism was laid down by
Politburo member and CCP Organisation Chief Li Yuanchao. In the wake of
the Bo scandal, Li asked officials to “seriously implement all regulations re-
garding clean government and discipline.” “Cadres must under all circum-
stances be able to uphold their sense of morality, maintain good behaviour,
and not succumb to corruption,” Li warned. Li added on another occasion
that in picking cadres for senior positions, the Organisation Department
“must first scrutinise their political standpoint… and political morality.” (92)
In other words, what matters most is a cadre’s total obeisance to instruc-
tions from on high. A similar note was struck by Xi Jinping in a long article
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in the Party’s theoretical journal Seeking Truth. The “crown prince” called
upon officials to “safeguard the purity of the party.” “We must resolutely
stop and combat any wrong political tendencies that veer from the party’s
basic lines,” he indicated. “Leading cadres must resolutely uphold the Party’s
principles, charter, goals, and policies.” (93) There seems little doubt that these
homilies were issued to rein in centrifugal tendencies exposed by the Bo
Xilai affair.
The powers-that-be, then, did not seem to realise that the Bo affair – in-
cluding rumours that he was contemplating the moral equivalent of a coup
d’état against the Hu-Wen leadership – was a testimony of the Maoist el-
ements in CCP politics, particularly the rule of personality. It seems clear
that the only way to prevent a recurrence of the Bo disaster – as well as
the Cultural Revolution – was to press ahead boldly with real political re-
form. It is therefore unfortunate that the reaction of the Hu leadership was
to put an even tighter squeeze on liberalisation, including the possibility of
a higher degree of free thinking among cadres and intellectuals.
Conclusion: Preserving the status quo at all
cost
For many intellectuals, changhong and other manifestations of the Maoist
resurgence are a contradiction in terms. As He Bing, a top law professor at
the China University of Political Science and Law put it: “In this absurd time,
they encourage you to sing revolutionary songs, but they do not encourage
you to wage a revolution.” For Renmin University political scientist Zhang
Ming, the ditties featured in changhong performances could at most be
called “pink songs.” “Red songs are mostly about revolution and violence,”
he said. “Now they only use red songs to praise the Party and Party mem-
bers; so it’s pointless.” (94)
Indeed, the Maoist revival says much about the CCP’s top priority of pre-
serving the status quo, especially its status as “perennial ruling party.” Bei-
jing’s nervousness about the loss of yiyuanhua – or “monolithic” – control
over ideology and politics is fully reflected by the authorities’ elaborate
studies of the reasons behind the fall of the USSR and the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Most mainstream theorists attribute the CPSU’s
demise to Soviet leaders’ failure to preserve “purity of thought” by sticking
to Marxism and Stalinism. Senior ideologue Zhang Quanjing said it well
when he put the blame of the CPSU’s collapse on de-Stalinisation. “The first
major reason behind the death of the CPSU is the negation of its leadership
and negation of party history,” he said. Turning to China, Zhang indicated:
“Since the era of reform, the West has sped up the pace of Westernising
and dividing up China. One of their main methods is to besmirch and vilify
Mao Zedong.” (95) In the same vein, CASS Vice-President Li Shenming pointed
out that the dissolution of the USSR stemmed from Soviet leaders’ “getting
away from and eventual betrayal of Marxism and socialism.” (96) Moreover,
Li asserted, the Soviet state-security apparatus failed to put the lid on dis-
sent. The ideologue fingered three forces as playing a pivotal role in chipping
away at the CPSU’s authority: underground publications, dissidents, and
NGOs. (97) As discussed above, the resuscitation of Maoist practices has
served the purpose of promoting the uniformity of thought – and weeding
out dissidents as well as bourgeois-liberal intellectuals and organisations.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss China’s future policies,
it is probable that the Hu Jintao – and Xi Jinping – leadership’s obsession
with preserving the CCP’s monopoly on power could leave them ill-disposed
and ill-equipped to rekindle those economic, administrative, and political
reforms that have been put on the back burner for the past couple of
decades. As pointed out in an earlier section, Xi, who will be the PBSC mem-
ber in charge of the CCP’s overall ideological orientation, is a firm believer
in the relevance and viability of Maoist thinking. Internationally, the financial
and debt problems encountered by the US and the EU – and China’s “white
knight” role in purchasing American and European bonds – will render the
CCP even more confident of its long-standing policy of upholding one-party
authoritarian rule. Pressure from abroad regarding the CCP’s human rights
and related abuses is also set to decrease. The possibilities are reasonably
high that Bo Xilai’s downfall notwithstanding, much of the restitution of
Maoist norms will continue into the Xi Jinping era. While a kind of spring of
democracy has swept through large swathes of the Middle East and North
Africa since early 2011, the Middle Kingdom seems destined to be shrouded
in deep winter for the foreseeable future.
z Willy Lam is an Adjunct Professor in the History Department as well
as in the Master’s Program in Global Political Economy of the Chinese
University of Hong Kong. He is also an Adjunct Professor of China
Studies at Akita International University, Japan.
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